ML: Representations in Cognitive Science

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FI2_W02 FI2_W10 FI2_W11 FI2_U03 FI2_U06 FI2_U07 FI2_U08 FI2_U13 FI2_K08

The aim of the lecture is to discuss the place and the explanatory role of the representation in the cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

The aim of the lecture is to discuss the place and the explanatory role of the representation in the cognitive science and philosophy of mind. We will discuss the representational position, as well as the arguments and objections against representation formulated by anti-representationalist. We will discuss classic proposals (including Representational Theory of Mind) and newer ones (e.g. S-representations). We will refer to the inferential theories (e.g. predictive processing, Brandom) and ecological (e.g. Gibson, Noë). The starting point will be the last book of Nicholas Shea "Representation in cognitive science" (2018).

Chemero, A. (2000) Anti-representationalism and the dynamical stance, Philosophy of Science 67 (4), 625-647

Chemero, T., 2009, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Clark, A., and D. Chalmers, 1998, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis, 58: 10–23.

Clark, A., and J. Toribio, 1994, “Doing without representing?” Synthese, 101: 401–431.

Dretske, F. (1995), Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

Fodor, J.A. (1975), The Language of Thought, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Fodor, J.A. (2003), LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gibson, J.J. (1979), The ecological approach to visual perception, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Gładziejewski P (2016) Predictive coding and representationalism. Synthese 193:559–582. doi:10.1007/ s11229-015-0762-9.

Gładziejewski, P. Miłkowski, M. (2017) Structural representations: causally relevant and different from detectors. Biol Philos 32:337–355 DOI 10.1007/s10539-017-9562-6

Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Noë, A., 2004, Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ramsey W. M. (2007) Representation reconsidered. Cambridge University Press.

Shagrir O (2012) Structural representations and the brain. Br J Philos Sci 63, 519–545. doi:10.1093/bjps/ axr038.

Sprevak M (2013) Fictionalism about neural representations. Monist 96, 539–560. doi:10.5840/ monist201396425

• Knowledge: student knows and understand contemporary discuss concerning representations, its terminology and concepts. He recognizes the basic philosophical problems concerning representations. He understands the specific relation between philosophy and cognitive science.

• Abilities: student single-handedly reads and understands the more philosophical articles concerning theory of representations.

• Expertise: student efficiently organizes his work.

Lecture with elements of the conservatory. Joint reading of texts and discussion.

• 2 - student doesn't know the foundations of the theory of representations. He doesn't recognize the most important thesis and problems concerning this issue.

• 3 - student badly knows the foundations of the theory of representations. He has a problem with recognize the most important thesis and problems concerning this issue.

• 4 - student knows the foundations of the theory of representations. He recognizes the most important thesis and problems concerning this issue.

• 5 - student very good knows the foundations of the theory of representations. He recognizes the most important thesis and problems concerning this issue, and he can use this knowledge into philosophical discussion.

Exam - Oral Exam and/or test

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